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Abstract
State governments have been passing laws mandating insurers to allow young adults
to stay on their parents’ health insurance plans past the age of 19 since the 1970s.
These laws were intended to increase coverage, but research has been inconclusive on
whether they were successful. We reconsider the issue with an improved approach
featuring three key elements: a new, accurate dataset on state mandates; recognition
that effects could differ greatly by age due to take up rate differences; and avoidance of
endogenous characteristics when identifying mandate eligible young adults. We find the
impact of the state mandates was concentrated among the 19 to 22 age group, for which
dependent coverage increased sharply by about 6 percentage points. Overall coverage
increased by almost 3 percentage points, with the difference explained by crowd out of
public insurance. Crowd out of coverage through young adults own jobs was negligible.
For those above age 22, we find little evidence of changes in coverage. We incorporate
these insights into analysis of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) dependent coverage
mandate, showing its effects were focused among those whom were previously ineligible
for state mandates, or were eligible but older than 22. We argue the ACA’s impact was
broader because it had fewer eligibility conditions that implied parental dependence;
young adults could be on their parents’ insurance but still be relatively independent.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1970s, state governments have been passing laws requiring insurers to increase the
ages for which adult children could remain on their parents’ health insurance plans. Absent
such laws, known as young adult dependent coverage mandates, children were typically only
eligible to stay on their parents’ group health plans until they turned 19 years old. This
contributed to a situation where young adults over age 18 were far less likely to be insured
than those 18 or younger.1 The states’ dependent coverage mandates were intended to
address this by requiring health insurers to allow children to remain on their parents’ plans
longer. It was not until the publicity surrounding the federal government’s Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (ACA), though, which included a dependent coverage mandate of
its own, that researchers began asking the question of whether the state mandates indeed
had the effect they were intended to have: increasing health insurance coverage rates of
young adults.
Unfortunately, there has not yet been a consensus on this question. Panel A of Table
1 briefly summarizes other work on the impact of the state mandates on health insurance
coverage. Levine et al. (2011) and Gamino (2018) argue that the state mandates increased
overall coverage, but Monheit et al. (2011) suggests they did not. Meanwhile, Depew (2015)
and Trudeau and Conway (2018) found it depended on the model they implemented. This
ambiguity regarding the impact of the state laws also flows into studies of the federal de-
pendent coverage mandate. Cantor et al. (2012a) found that the ACA mandate had a much
larger effect on individuals who were already eligible for dependent coverage via a pre-existing
state mandate than it did for those for whom the ACA was their first chance to access de-
pendent coverage. In contrast, Akosa Antwi et al. (2013) found that the ACA’s effect on
dependent coverage of young adults was no different between states with and without their
own mandates. This inconsistent state mandate literature is surprising considering that, as
panel B of Table 1 summarizes, the literature on the ACA mandate’s effects on health insur-
ance coverage has been largely in agreement. Cantor et al. (2012a), Sommers and Kronick
(2012), Akosa Antwi et al. (2013), Sommers et al. (2013), and Gamino (2018) all argued
the ACA had substantial effects on overall rates of coverage for young adults. One is left to
wonder: why has the literature been unable to show consistently that the state mandates
achieved their goal?
A few possible answers for this question have been offered by the literature. First, it
has been noted by most authors that states have more limited authority to regulate health
insurance plans than the federal government, which would explain tepid effectiveness found
1In many cases, children also lose their public insurance coverage when they turn 19 years old.
3
by some authors. The states’ limited authority is due to the federal Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which exempts self-insured group plans from state
regulation (Pierron and Fronstin, 2008). This explanation, however, fails to account for
the popularity of the mandates among state governments, as more than half have adopted
them over the last forty years. Why would they be so eager to adopt policies with limited
effectiveness? Moreover, states have been shown able to affect other types of health plan
benefits despite ERISA limitations (Gruber, 1994; Schmidt, 2007; Bitler and Schmidt, 2012;
Bitler and Carpenter, 2016, 2017). A second possible explanation is information, as Cantor
et al. (2012a) speculated that the state mandates made people more aware of the ACA, while
Akosa Antwi et al. (2013) suggested they may not have understood the state mandates well.
These arguments both seem difficult to justify. The ACA was well publicized following a
societal and political debate on the topic leading up to its passage, so state policies seem
unlikely to have been a major determinant to people’s awareness of it. Furthermore, the state
mandates did not really require covered individuals to have much since information would
naturally flow to members of affected health plans as their dependents did not automatically
age out of coverage at 19. A third suggested explanation is difficulty in measurement, as
the literature has noted that the results of Levine et al. (2011) and Monheit et al. (2011)
are sensitive to data and specification choices, raising doubts about their validity (Burgdorf,
2014, 2015; Monheit et al., 2015; Gamino, 2018). Moreover, Depew (2015) and Trudeau
and Conway (2018) found estimates were sensitive to the method used to classify who was
eligible for state mandates.
In this study, we revisit the question of the effectiveness of the dependent coverage man-
dates, and take steps towards resolving the ambiguity in the literature regarding their effects.
We show that the state mandates did, in fact, achieve success at increasing overall health
insurance coverage among those most likely to meet eligibility requirements and take up cov-
erage. Moreover, the impact of the state mandates is also manifest in the effects of the federal
mandate, which had less influence among those for whom the state mandates had already
increased coverage. Among those not previously affected by the state mandates, though, we
find large effects of the ACA mandate, and these are notably similar in magnitude to the
effects found for the state laws.
We find these results using an approach that is unique in combining three important
empirical components. First, we use a newly available dataset on the history of the state
mandates compiled via meticulous review of state statutes and their histories by Barkowski
and McLaughlin (2018). Unlike the ACA mandate, which expanded coverage to all young
adults under 26 years old on the same date, the state mandates had varying eligibility ages
and other criteria, with implementation occurring at different times across states over the
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past 40 years. This new dataset contains detailed information on the eligibility criteria and
implementation dates for the complete history of the state mandates. Other authors have
used data for the state mandates that contained numerous omissions and errors regarding
when, where, and how the laws were adopted. The legal research our analysis relies on,
however, substantially corrects these issues, allowing for improved measurement of mandate
effects.2 Second, we analyze the effects of the mandates for separate age groups based on
the insight that as young adults age, they quickly gain independence from their parents
across numerous aspects of their lives. The more independent young adults are, the less
likely they are to take up coverage through their parents’ health plans. Moreover, the state
mandates often had eligibility criteria that were harder for individuals to satisfy as they
gained independence. For example, most state laws required dependents to be unmarried.
Consequently, we study these mandates across different age groups with the expectation that
the youngest of the eligible individuals are most likely to be eligible and take up coverage.
Our results show that (part of) the reason previous authors struggled to find effects of the
state mandates was because they estimated combined effects between groups with strong im-
pacts and others with small effects. The result was diluted estimates for the state mandates.
Third, we depart from the bulk of the literature by avoiding reliance on endogenous per-
sonal characteristics when identifying individuals who were eligible for coverage under state
mandates. As noted by Depew (2015), relying on these characteristics reduces measurement
error, but potentially introduces bias of an unknown character.
In sum, using our new data and analytical approach, we are able to provide a more com-
prehensive understanding of the dependent coverage mandates, the extent of their efficacy,
and the degree to which state and federal efforts interacted. The state mandates were effec-
tive, but limited in their reach not because of limits to state regulatory power, but due to
their greater dependency requirements. The ACA filled in to spaces the state mandates had
not reached, affecting individuals who had not taken up previously available coverage due
to eligibility restrictions, as well as those not previously covered by state mandates.
2 State and Federal Dependent Coverage Mandates
The federal government’s effort to address the high uninsurance rate of young adults began
in March 2010 with the passage of the ACA. The ACA dependent coverage mandate allows
young adults to remain eligible for coverage on their parents’ health insurance until they
2Accurate coding of laws is, of course, contingent on correct interpretation. The main text and (espe-
cially) the appendix to Barkowski and McLaughlin (2018) provide details on the statutes and discussion of
their interpretations.
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reach age 26, without any restriction on marital, educational, residency, or dependency
status. Though this was the first experience of many in the country with a dependent
coverage mandate, the ACA was not entirely revolutionary. Instead, it was based on a
blueprint set out by state efforts that had begun decades prior. Since the first such law,
passed by Louisiana in 1974, the number of state-level expansions of dependent coverage has
risen with increasing intensity, reaching 33 at the time of the ACA’s implementation (see
Table 2).
Although the main motivation and the overall structure of the mandates are similar be-
tween the federal and state mandates, they nonetheless have some important eligibility and
implementation differences. For the case of the federal government’s mandate, eligibility
applied to all young adults younger than 26 years old effective September, 2010. In contrast,
the state mandates often have additional eligibility criteria, such as dependents having to
be unmarried, students, living with their parents, or financially dependent on them. Addi-
tionally, limiting ages – the ages under which young adults could be considered dependents
on their parents’ health plans – have varied across states and time. In total, through the
effective date of the federal mandate, there were 50 distinct enactments or material changes
in state mandates. The history of these changes in limiting ages are summarized (through
2010) in Table 2. Two examples that illustrate the variety in eligibility criteria are Texas
and South Dakota. Texas’ mandate first went operational in January 2002 with a limiting
age of 25 and a requirement that dependents be unmarried. It has not changed since.3 South
Dakota’s law, in contrast, has not remained static. Originally effective in July 2004, it had
a limiting age of 24 and a requirement that dependents be full-time students. In 2007, the
effective limiting age was further raised to 30 for students without another source for health
insurance – except for those individuals born before July 1st, 1983, for whom the increase
did not apply.
The state mandate data we rely on from Barkowski and McLaughlin (2018) reflect state
statutes that targeted the large group health insurance market, which is the dominant source
of health insurance in the country, and has the most cost and tax advantages.4 To consider
3Though the mandate has not been changed, the codification of Texas law underwent reorganization in
2005. This reorganization resulted from passage of a new bill in 2003, though its changes were not effective
until 2005. This change probably explains why other authors incorrectly specified Texas’ mandate as going
into effect on dates from 2003 through 2005.
4Statutes often did not specify any particular target market, and so are included in our data. There
are some cases where states had mandates for the small employer group or individual plan markets, but
none in the large group market, and so are not included in our data. Examples include Okalahoma, which
has a small employer mandate, and South Carolina, which has mandates in both the small employer and
individual markets. Barkowski and McLaughlin did not collect information on small group or individual
markets systematically, so there is room for further research collecting information on these mandates in the
future.
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a state to have a mandate, Barkowski and McLaughlin require it to have a statute setting
a mandatory limiting age above 19 (as they take every state’s default limiting age as 19).5
They did not, however, include mandates allowing adult children with work-limiting dis-
abilities to stay on their parents’ plans, since the vast majority of states had such laws and
they applied to very small portions of the population. Their data were culled primarily
from LexisNexis, HeinOnline, state government websites, and direct communication with
state insurance departments or legislative analysts. Complete details on the laws and their
interpretation can be found in the appendix to Barkowski and McLaughlin (2018).
Table 2 presents a comparison of the maximum ages of eligibility (which is one year
less than the limiting age) and years of expansion for state mandates according to the data
we use, and those used by other authors investigating the effects of the state mandates on
health insurance coverage (Levine et al., 2011; Monheit et al., 2011; Depew, 2015; Trudeau
and Conway, 2018; Gamino, 2018). We find that there are significant differences between our
legal data and those of these other studies.6 Louisiana and Connecticut provide two cases
which illustrate some of the differences between our data and those of previous authors, and
also serve as helpful examples of the language of state mandates. In the case of Louisiana,
Levine et al. (2011) and Monheit et al. (2011) code the state as having no mandate, while
Depew (2015) and Trudeau and Conway (2018) code it as having one starting in 2009, and
Gamino (2018) has it beginning in 1997. We find, however, that it had one dating back to
1974 with a limiting age of 24, requiring a dependent be unmarried, a student, and financially
dependent on his or her parents. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 22:215.4, as effective July 12,
1974, provides the following:
[S]tudents who are unmarried children who have not yet attained the age of
twenty-four and who are enrolled as full-time students at an accredited college or
university, or at a vocational, technical, vocational-technical or trade school or
institute, or secondary school, and who are dependent upon the primary insured
under any group health and accident or franchise health and accident insurance
policy issued in this state for their support, shall be considered as dependents
under the provisions of said policy.
The law remained the same for the general population until 2010, when it was amended
to mimic the ACA’s mandate. The fact that the mandate dated back so far may explain
5There are at least a few cases where state statutes were passed that explicitly allowed extension of
coverage to those above 19, but did not require it. One example is Virginia, which allowed expanded
coverage starting in 1986, but did not require such coverage until 2011.
6Cantor et al. (2012b), Dillender (2014), and Hahn and Yang (2016) study other outcomes using the
state mandates, and there are similar differences between their law data and ours.
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why Levine et al. (2011) and Monheit et al. (2011) were not aware of it. In 1997, the text
of the statute was amended to ease eligibility for only those with mental health disabilities
(and was not targeted at the general population), which probably explains the date given
by Gamino (2018), while a reorganization of the state’s codification of laws in 2009 (which
did not change the content of the statute) might be the reason for the date given by Depew
(2015) and Trudeau and Conway (2018).
The mandate for Connecticut was enacted in 1976. Like Louisiana, this mandate was
extended only to unmarried students who were still financially dependent on their parents,
but had a lower limiting age of 23. From the General Statutes of Connecticut, Sec. 38a-554.
(Formerly Sec. 38-374), as effective April 1, 1976:
A group comprehensive health care plan shall contain the minimum standard
benefits prescribed in section 3 of this act, including the choice of the low option,
middle option or high option deductible, and shall also conform in substance
to the requirements of this section. (a) The plan shall be one under which the
individuals eligible to be covered include: (1) Each eligible employee; (2) the
spouse of each eligible employee; and (3) dependent unmarried children, who are
under the age of nineteen or are full-time students under the age of twenty-three
at an accredited institution of higher learning.
The statute remained the same until the limiting age was raised to 26 in 2007 when the
student requirement was dropped and a state residency requisite was added. In 2009, the
residency requirement was dropped, with no other changes, and in 2011 the limiting age was
raised to 26 for children without their own employer provided insurance. As in the case of
Louisiana, both Levine et al. (2011) and Monheit et al. (2011) code Connecticut as having
no mandate and Depew (2015) and Trudeau and Conway (2018) code it with one since 2009.
Gamino (2018) comes much closer, coding its beginning as 1982. The age of the statute was,
once again, likely an influence in these mis-codings. Also similar to Louisiana, the relatively
minor change to the law in 2009 is probably the cause of the 2009 record for the law held by
Depew (2015) and Trudeau and Conway (2018).7
Beyond eligibility requirements and timing, another important difference between the
federal and state mandates is that states’ abilities to regulate health plans are more limited
than those of the federal government due to ERISA. According to statistics produced by
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality using Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
7Another possible contributor is the fact that Connecticut’s law in this area is particularly obscure.
Barkowski and McLaughlin received significant aid in finding and interpreting the state’s laws from Senior
Legislative Attorney Janet L. Kaminski Leduc of the Connecticut General Assembly’s Office of Legislative
Research.
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data,8 as of 2010 in the USA, 35.8 percent of private-sector establishments offering health
insurance self-insured at least one plan. For those with 50 or more employees, that figure is
63.3 percent. This suggests that a significant portion of the population may not have seen
access expand due to state mandates. Despite this limitation on states’ authority, previous
authors have shown that states have been able to influence health insurance benefits through
mandates. These include maternity benefits (Gruber, 1994), infertility treatments (Schmidt,
2007; Bitler and Schmidt, 2012), and cancer screening (Bitler and Carpenter, 2016, 2017).
Additionally, there is some reason to think that state mandates may influence health plans
that are not explicitly subject to state authority. In particular, competition may induce
firms to offer similar benefits in their health plans in order to attract quality employees.
This theory is consistent with past research showing self-insured firm plans having similar
benefits and costs as those that were not self-insured (Acs et al., 1996; Jensen et al., 1998;
Gabel et al., 2003). Nevertheless, in the context of our study, the limitation to the states’
authority has an important implication: it leaves scope for the federal government’s ACA
mandate to increase health insurance access to young adults, even in states with pre-existing
mandates.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Effects of State Mandates
The outcomes of interest in this study, indicated by H, are indicator variables for individual
health insurance coverage via one of several different sources (such as public, private, or
any). For our analysis of state mandates, our independent variable of interest is ELIG, also
an indicator, representing young adults’ imputed eligibility for health insurance coverage as
dependents on their parents’ plans.9 We impute eligibility on the basis of survey respondents’
states of residence, ages, and interview years, assigning ELIG a value of one when all of
those factors agree with our coding of a state mandate, and zero if not.
Since this coding scheme implies that ELIG varies across three dimensions, we estimate
the impact of eligibility by implementing a triple differences (DDD) model. This approach
allows us to identify the effect using within-state variation (across ages and time), while
controlling for observable differences across those dimensions, measured using non-mandate
states. In practice, this means our econometric models include a full set of two-way fixed-
8See https://meps.ahrq.gov/data stats/summ tables/insr/state/series 2/2010/tiia2a.htm, viewed April
5, 2018
9We emphasize this is imputed because actual eligibility is not observable in the data we use (nor any
other government survey, as far as we are aware).
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effects – age-by-state, age-by-year, and state-by-year – that control for trends across those
dimensions in an unrestricted way. Thus, the identification assumption of our DDD model
is that there were no other age-by-state-by-year variables that are correlated with imputed
eligibility (that is, the state mandates) that also affect health insurance coverage.
Our model takes the following functional form:
Hiast = α + ρELIGast + γas + δat + µst +X
′
iastΘ + uiast, (1)
where i, s, t, and a index individuals, states, years, and ages, respectively. X is a column vec-
tor of individual and macroeconomic control variables, including dummies for gender, race,
ethnicity, and metropolitan area classifications, plus age-year-state specific employment-to-
population and poverty ratios. Race controls include white, black, Native American, Asian,
Pacific Islander, other single race, and numerous additional multi-race indicators. Ethnicity
controls include dummies for not Hispanic and several categories of Hispanic/Latino ori-
gins. Metropolitan area classifications include central city, outside central city, unknown
central city status, not in metro area, and not identifiable. We calculated our employment-
to-population and poverty ratios using data from the American Community Survey and the
2000 Census 5% sample (ACS) (Ruggles et al., 2017), defining poverty as having family
income below 150 percent of the federal poverty threshold. We estimated equation (1) via
weighted least squares and clustered all standard errors at the state level.10 This model has
the same primary features as ones implemented by Depew (2015) and Trudeau and Conway
(2018).
Our imputation of eligibility for this model on the basis of only age, state, and year means
that we are leaving aside the additional eligibility requirements of some state mandates,
the most notable being marital and school enrollment requirements. This a key difference
between our analysis and that of other authors (aside from Depew 2015 and Trudeau and
Conway 201811) who all use student or marital statuses (or both) as part of their imputation
methods. We avoid using these since Depew (2015) argued they are potentially endogenous,
an argument that was given empirical credence by previous work on marriage by Abramowitz
(2016) and Barkowski and McLaughlin (2018). The disadvantage of this approach is that
some individuals will be misclassified in our analysis, implying some attenuation in our
estimates. We view this conservative approach as preferable to using the additional eligibility
requirements, which would potentially introduce upward bias. This concern is also the
10All regression parameter estimates and standard error are calculated using the “areg” and “cluster”
option commands in Stata/MP 13.1 for Windows (StataCorp, 2013).
11Depew (2015) and Trudeau and Conway (2018) both implement two models in their analyses – one in
which they use the student and marital statuses as part of their imputations for eligibility, and one where
they use only age, state, and year.
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reason behind our choice to not include the other eligibility criteria as controls in our model.
Moreover, we also do not include individual-level employment or income as controls, either,
as Dillender (2014) suggests these also may be influenced by the state mandates.
We apply our econometric model to a sample of young adults who were the primary
targets of the state expansions: those aged 19 to 29 years. As we noted above, though,
these years in young adults’ lives are ones of significant transition where individuals rapidly
become independent of their parents. Remaining part of parental health insurance plans is
one form of parental dependence, particularly since many state mandates explicitly required
residential or financial parental dependency. Other eligibility requirements, like being a
student or unmarried, also imply less independence for young adults. Hence, we expect that
the effects of the state mandates to be stronger among the younger individuals we study,
since they are more likely to satisfy the dependency requirements of the laws and take up
coverage through their parents. So, in addition to the 19 to 29 age group, we also apply
our model to several subsamples of ages: 19 to 25, the age group targeted by the ACA
mandate; 19 to 22; 23 to 25; and 26 to 29. This approach is another important difference
between our study and that of the bulk other authors, and allows us to uncover a key factor
in understanding the role of the state mandates played in the lives of young adults.
While the goal of the state mandates was clearly to increase health insurance cover-
age, the manner in which they attempt to do this has implications for the sources by which
young adults obtain their coverage. Since most parents obtain their health insurance through
an employer, we expect that the mandates should increase coverage primarily through ex-
panded employer provided dependent coverage.12 This may also have implications for other
insurance sources, since dependent coverage may increase by crowding out other sources,
as both Levine et al. (2011) and Monheit et al. (2011) previously argued. We, therefore,
apply our model to several different insurance coverage sources, expecting the policies to
directly increase dependent coverage types, but potentially decrease those available through
independent sources, such as via young adults’ own jobs or public sources. For outcomes
that aggregate coverage types, like private or coverage from any source, the expected effects
are ambiguous, as they depend on the extent of crowd out.
A final aspect of our empirical strategy to identify the state mandate effects that needs
to be discussed is the coding of ELIG. First, we note that enactment and effective dates of
laws are often not the same date, so we are careful to consider effective dates when imputing
12More precisely, dependent coverage through a parent’s plan should increase. Dependent coverage more
generally could, in theory, have an ambiguous prediction because one could be covered on a spouse’s plan, as
noted by Burgdorf (2014), and spousal dependent coverage could be crowded out by parental coverage. In
our analysis, we do not identify effects on parental coverage specifically, but we do review effects on spousal
coverage to check for the extent of crowd out.
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values for ELIG. Second, since the level of observation in this study is person-year, we
need to assign all effective dates for mandates to the beginning of a year, even though the
laws actually had various effective dates throughout the calendar year. Our approach is to
assign all mandates with effective dates before July 1st as being effective for the whole year
in which the mandate actually became effective. For mandates with effective dates July 1st
or later, we assign the mandate as effective starting the beginning of the following year.
This approach is intended to minimize the amount of misclassification taking place at the
implementation of states’ policies.
3.2 Interaction of State and ACA mandates
The second focus of our study is the federal dependent coverage mandate, with particular at-
tention on how pre-existing state mandates influenced its impact. Since the ACA’s mandate
was implemented across all 19 to 25 year olds in the country at the same time, we cannot
use our DDD strategy above to identify its effects, as the age-by-year fixed effects would
absorb the ACA effects. We therefore use the difference-in-differences (DD) approach that
has become standard in the ACA mandate literature (Cantor et al., 2012a; Akosa Antwi et
al., 2013; Sommers et al., 2013). This strategy compares those targeted by the ACA mandate
to a control group of older individuals who were not targeted by the ACA.13 We adapt this
strategy to our context, using a model that allows us to estimate the effect of the federal
dependent coverage mandate on those eligible for state mandates separately from those who
are not. This model takes the form:
Hiast = α + β1ACAat · POSTt · ELIGast + β2ACAat · POSTt + β3ACAat · ELIGast
+ β4POSTt · ELIGast + β5ELIGast + γas + µst +X ′iastΘ + uiast, (2)
where the dummy ACA identifies the young adults targeted by the federal mandate (the 19
to 25 year olds, inclusive) and POST indicates years after 2010 – the effective years of the
federal mandate. The definitions of other variables are the same as in equation (1), with X
containing the same set of control variables. This model has the same basic form as that of
Cantor et al. (2012a), with our stronger controls for trends (state-by-year and state-by-age)
and method of coding ELIG being the key differences.
Equation (2) has two primary parameters of interest, β1 and β2, which allow us to measure
13Some authors also use individuals under age 19 as part of the control group, which we opt not to do
since those individuals always have access to their parents’ health insurance plans. Given this, we doubt the
validity of using these individuals as stand-ins for the treatment group’s counterfactual, since the treated
individuals would not have such access in the unobserved counterfactual.
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three relevant quantities. The first of these, represented by β2, is the DD effect of the ACA
on young adults not eligible for coverage via state mandates. This reflects the comparison of
individuals aged 19 to 25 to those above 25, among those not eligible for any state mandate.
The second quantity, represented by β1 + β2, is the effect of the ACA on state mandate
eligible young adults, and also reflects a DD comparing the older and younger individuals,
though this time only among those eligible for state mandates. The final object of interest
is β1, the difference between the first two quantities. We report estimates for each of these
quantities in our discussion of our results, below.
We apply equation (2) to three different age groups. The first is those aged 19 to 28,
inclusive. Our exclusion of age 29 individuals is a departure from our state mandate analysis;
we make this change to increase the similarity of the control group of individuals above 25
to the younger treatment group. The second group is comprised of ages 19 to 22 and 26 to
28, and excludes 23 to 25 year olds to isolate the effect on the younger individuals targeted
by the federal mandate. Finally, the third group is those aged 23 to 28, which enables us
to estimate the effect solely on the 23 to 25 year olds.14 Splitting our analysis across these
age groups allows us to complement our state inquiry and see whether ACA effects were
heterogeneous across ages, and how state effects on age subgroups interacted with the ACA.
We expect that if the state mandates were successful in increasing insurance coverage for a
subgroup, then the impact of the ACA would be attenuated for that group, since it would
not be introducing any actual treatment.15
Finally, before moving to a discussion of our data, we note that our coding of the POST
variable implies an effective date of the ACA as the start of 2011, despite its true effective
date being in 2010. Since our data is annual, we could only chose the beginning of 2010 or
2011 to model the law’s implementation, and the choice of 2011 is consistent with how we
coded state mandate effective dates, since the ACA officially became effective after July 1st,
2010.
14We also analyzed a sample of 19 to 28 year olds that excludes 26 year olds, as 26 is the transition age
between eligibility for the ACA mandate or not, as a robustness check. The results were quantitatively and
qualitatively similar, if not slightly stronger, than the base case we report.
15In spite of this rationale, there is some ex ante reason to doubt whether the interaction of state and
federal mandates could operate in this manner. Cantor et al. (2012a), who analyzed a very similar model to
equation 2, found that the effects of the ACA were larger for those previously eligible for state mandates.
Still, given the strength of the theoretical argument, we argue attenuation should be the result we expect to
observe.
13
4 Data
We apply our empirical strategies laid out above to a sample of data on health insurance
coverage from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Popu-
lation Survey (CPS) for the survey years 2001 through 2013 (Flood et al., 2017). Coverage
questions in this survey are retrospective, so refer to years 2000 through 2012. In robustness
checks, we extend our sample back to reference year 1990 (survey year 1991) for outcomes
where data availability allows, and for the rest back to reference year 1996 (sample year
1997). For our study of the state mandates before the implementation of the ACA, we end
our sample in reference year 2010 so as to exclude the federal mandate’s influence. For
our analysis of the interaction of both state and federal mandates, however, we do not end
our sample until reference year 2012 (survey year 2013), after which the health insurance
questions in the CPS underwent significant redesign. We start our primary sample for both
analyses in reference year 2000 to coincide with the availability of annual data from the ACS
and the 2000 census, which we use for measures of employment and poverty (Ruggles et
al., 2017). In our extended sample, reference year 1990 was chosen as start date to corre-
spond with the period in which we had coded our state mandate data into database format.
Hereafter, when we refer to a year of our data, we mean the reference year unless otherwise
stated.
We chose the CPS for our analysis because of its long and (relatively) consistent history
as a survey of health insurance coverage, and because it offers significant detail regarding
coverage source. These characteristics have made it popular among researchers, as it is
widely used for estimates of insurance coverage. Nevertheless, there are some difficulties
related to using this survey for our analysis. One of these is survey non-response, which was
typically above 15 percent during the period covered by our sample (for example, see the
Source and Accuracy Statement for U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2005). While the Census
Bureau imputes data for these observations, we exclude them from our analysis and use the
weight variable developed by the State Health Access Data Assistance Center (SHADAC)
for use with their summary CPS health insurance variables, which adjusts for the dropped
non-response observations. We use the SHADAC summary health insurance variables in
place of the original CPS variables when possible, but we use the same SHADAC weight in
either case.16
Another potential concern with the CPS is measurement error. Many studies have shown
that the uninsurance rate in the CPS is systematically higher than that measured by other
16The SHADAC summary health insurance variables address other issues found in the original health
insurance variables, as well. More information can be found in the documentation for these variables at
https://cps.ipums.org/cps-action/variables/group?id=asec_hisum.
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surveys (Swartz, 1986; Bennefield, 1996; Bhandari, 2004; Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2005).
One possible reason for this is the retrospective perspective of the survey, which asks re-
spondents between February and April about coverage during the entire previous calendar
year. This results in a long recall period for respondents, which may result in underre-
porting of short coverage spells (Bhandari, 2004). In our view, though, this issue is more
indicative of an interpretation problem than measurement error. We argue that, instead
of measuring coverage at any point during the previous year, the CPS measures coverage
at a point-in-time closer to the date of the interview, as has been previously suggested by
Swartz (1986). This view is supported by research undertaken by the Census Bureau before
implementation of the health insurance redesign. During the 2013 ASEC interview cycle, the
Census Bureau implemented the original health insurance questions and the redesigned ones
on parallel samples of individuals. This allowed them to estimate health insurance coverage
using the traditional approach as well as a method representing a time-of-interview estimate
and a method more clearly referencing coverage during the previous calendar year. The
traditional method estimates resulting from this were much closer to the time-of-interview
estimates than the new calendar year ones (Pascale et al., 2016). Nevertheless, we do not
fully abandon the retrospective interpretation, since the survey does reference the previous
year. Instead, we interpret the CPS as measuring coverage approximately at the end of the
previous year. Given that health insurance is highly serially correlated within individuals, in
our view this reconciles the results obtained by (Pascale et al., 2016) with the retrospective
framing of the survey.
The interpretation of health insurance questions in the CPS is significant for this study
because it informs our treatment of respondents’ ages, which influence the values taken by
ELIG. Since the CPS is retrospective, we essentially match our CPS data for a given survey
to our state law data for the previous year (so that it matches the reference year). This
method raises the question of how to treat respondents ages, which are measured as of the
interview date. In particular, should we adjust the ages used to impute eligibility for state
mandates or the federal law to be one year less than observed in the survey, so as to match
the retrospective perspective? We chose not to do this, keeping ages as observed in the first
quarter of the survey year under the rationale that the age observed then is likely to be the
same as what it would have been at the end of the reference year, when we argue health
insurance status is observed. Our belief is all other authors have also done the same, though
we are only able to confirm this for Levine et al. (2011), whose underlying data and programs
are available publicly; other authors have not discussed this question.
15
5 Results
Before discussing our main results, we first report basic characteristics of our sample. Table
3 presents descriptive statistics of our data split into four sub-groups: under 26 years old and
eligible or not for state mandates, and over 25 and eligible or not. The first two groups are
used in our first, pre-ACA state mandate analysis, while all four are used in our state/federal
interactions analysis. In general, we observe similarities across the four groups for any health
insurance, public, private, Medicaid, Military, Medicare, and individually purchased health
insurance. Having any health insurance is slightly more likely for those who are ineligible
and 26 years or older. We observe large differences across four groups for employer provided
coverage, own group policy, and covered as a dependent. Having coverage as a dependent
is more likely for the younger age group, particularly for those eligible under state laws.
Complementing this, we note that the older individuals are more likely to have their own
policies, as do younger ones ineligible under state laws. Gender, race, and ethnicity are
similar across groups, while the older groups have higher incomes on average, as would be
expected. Metropolitan classification shows some differences across groups, with eligible
individuals being more likely to be located outside of a central city area, and ineligible
individuals being more likely to not be in a metropolitan area at all. Marital status also
reflects expected differences across age, with older individuals being much more likely to be
married or divorced.
5.1 Effects of State Mandates
Estimates of equation (1) based on our sample for the years 2000 through 2010 are reported
in Table 4. We also present a set of estimates based on our extended sample for the years
1990 or 1996 through 2010, reported as a robustness check, in Appendix Table 1.17 As we
discuss below, our estimates are similar in both sample periods. All cells in the tables report
estimates for ρ produced by separate regressions which differ on the basis of the outcomes or
samples used, as indicated by the row and column headers. All estimates reported in these
tables should be interpreted as percentage point changes (for example, 0.01 represents a one
percentage point increase) in health insurance coverage attributable to eligibility for a state
mandate.
17These regressions on the extended sample differ from those on the primary sample in that they exclude
the poverty and employment controls due to data availability. Since we employ DDD models in our state
mandates analysis, the employment and poverty variables must vary at the state-age-year level, but the CPS
has very small sample sizes in some state-age-year cells. Therefore, we use ACS/Census data, with its larger
sample size, to calculate these measures. Annual ACS/census data only stretches back to 2000, though, so
we use them only in our analysis of the main sample and exclude them for the extended sample.
16
We begin with column (1) of Table 4, where we report results for the full range of ages in
our sample, 19 through 29. Effects on this age range overall are weak, though we note that we
estimate dependent coverage to increase by almost a percentage point, and coverage outside
the home to increase by half a percentage point, both of which are significant (p < 0.1). The
CPS does not specifically identify the source of health insurance outside the home, but the
nature of coverage outside the home implies it would be some sort of dependent coverage –
likely parental since spouses usually live together. Thus, both of these results are consistent
with the expected effects of the mandates. Most of the other estimates are not statistically
significant at conventional levels of significance, but our point estimates for private coverage
and coverage from any source both are about one-and-a-half percentage points, results that
are consistent with the dependent coverage estimates. For an unclear reason, we also obtain a
statistically significant increase in military insurance coverage of about 0.9 percentage points,
though this result is much smaller and insignificant in our extended sample (Appendix Table
1). Other estimates in our extended sample are similar in most cases.
Among the other work in the literature, the figures reported in column (1) are most
comparable to estimates produced by Depew (2015) and Trudeau and Conway (2018), since
both authors used CPS samples of 19 through 29 year olds, used similar DDD models, and
imputed eligibility via age, state, and year. Depew reports a 2.3 percentage point increase
in parental dependent coverage, and a one percentage point increase in any insurance, the
latter of which is not statistically significant. Since Depew’s measure of dependent coverage
specifically identifies coverage through a parent and includes coverage outside the home in
this measure (which we separate out), his results are fairly consistent with ours. Trudeau and
Conway (2018) report only an estimate for any insurance, finding an insignificant increase
of 0.4 percentage points. Both our main and extended sample estimates are bigger than
this, but neither is significant. Our results for any coverage, therefore, generally agree with
estimates from both previous studies.18
Column (2) reports results for the age range 19 to 25, the target ages of the federal man-
date. Here we find a set of estimates that is often similar to the ones in column (1), though
none of these results are statistically significant, and some figures suggest weaker effects. In
particular, estimates for private or any coverage are both about half the size as in column
(1). On the other hand, the strongest estimates from column (1), dependent and coverage
outside the home, are notably similar in magnitude in column (2). Several other authors
(Levine et al., 2011; Monheit et al., 2011; Trudeau and Conway, 2018; Gamino, 2018) have
18Their smaller estimates would be consistent with attenuation due to misclassification of eligibility,
something our estimates would suffer from much less due to our improved coding of state mandates, but
sample differences could also be the driving force. Depew employs years 2000 through 2009 and Trudeau
and Conway use 1997 through 2009.
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reported estimates for a similar age range (19 to either 24 or 25), though the appropriateness
of comparison is unclear because, in addition to different sample year ranges and different
mandate codings, each of these has included student or marital status requirements, or both,
as part of their eligibility imputations. Generally, these analyses return stronger estimates
than ours, with Levine et al. (2011), Trudeau and Conway (2018), and Gamino (2018) each
finding effects on any coverage of around three percentage points. Monheit et al. (2011)
found increased dependent coverage crowded out coverage through own employers, resulting
in no significant effects on overall coverage. Thus, for this type of sample our results are
quite different from other studies, but this is unsurprising given the data and methodological
discrepancies between the studies.
To this point, our estimates obtained using corrected legal data show weak evidence of
effects for the state mandates. However, when we restrict our sample to ages 19 through
22, as in column (3), the results are drastically different. For this subsample, we estimate
a statistically significant (p < 0.01) increase of approximately 5.8 percentage points for
dependent coverage. This represents a sizable effect of about 17 percent when compared to
this subsample’s dependent coverage rate of 34 percent. Additionally, we find a significant
increase in coverage outside the home of 1.3 percentage points (p < 0.05). Since our measure
of dependent coverage includes both parental and spousal coverage, we note that we also
estimate a small, but statistically significant, reduction in spousal dependent coverage (p <
0.05), which is consistent with some individuals trading off spousal for parental coverage
(Abramowitz, 2016; Barkowski and McLaughlin, 2018). This spousal coverage estimate also
suggests our results are not subject to the critique levied by Burgdorf (2014, 2015) against
Monheit et al. (2011), that their model found effects through spousal coverage, not parental,
a result inconsistent with the policy’s legal mechanism. Combined, dependent coverage and
coverage outside the home account for the substantial portion of the significant 7.4 percentage
point increase (p < 0.01) in private coverage we estimate.
Turning to overall coverage, we see our employer and private insurance results translate
into a 2.8 percentage point increase in coverage from any source – roughly four percent of the
overall health insurance coverage rate for this age group. To our knowledge, this is the first
statistically significant effect (p < 0.05) for the state mandates on overall coverage in the
literature that does not use endogenous criteria when imputing eligibility. Despite this, it is
notable that the effect overall is much smaller than the private coverage effect, a difference
that seems to be entirely due to crowd out of public coverage. In particular, we estimate
reductions of 3.4 and 1.5 percentage points in Medicaid and military coverage, respectively,
due to the state mandates (both p < 0.05), and find public coverage overall decreases by 4.1
18
percentage points (p < 0.01).19 While at first glance one might be surprised to see an effect
on military coverage, such a result is consistent with young adults substituting parental for
employment coverage, something other authors have suggested was plausible (Monheit et al.,
2011). Additionally, our significant 1.7 percentage point estimate (p < 0.01) for individual
coverage might be unexpected, but we argue this result is not implausible. While our research
on the state laws focused on group dependent coverage mandates, many states’ mandates
had scopes that were broader than just group coverage. Our interpretation of this estimate
is, therefore, that young adults were added to their parents’ individually purchased plans
as dependents. With regard to the estimates from our extended sample in Appendix Table
1, we find that most are similar to our main results. Two notable differences are those for
individual and outside home coverage. The first of these does not have a significant effect
in the extended sample, while the second estimate is a significant decrease of 1.5 percentage
points. While we do not have any insight as to why we observe these changes, we note that
private and overall coverage estimates do not reflect the full differences observed in these
outcomes.
With one exception, other authors in this literature have not studied any sub-groups
younger than the 19 to 24 year old groups, so comparison with other authors’ work is
difficult for this sample. The only exception, Burgdorf (2014), replicated the model used
by Levine et al. (2011) and then used it to produce separate estimates for each age within
the 19 to 24 group. These estimates were sensitive to model and sample specifications and
not uniformly statistically significant, but the point estimates were generally larger for the
younger ages. This is roughly consistent with our findings, even if the differences in data
and analytic approaches make comparison tenuous.
We move next to estimates where the sample is restricted to ages 23 through 25, presented
in column (4). For this range of ages, we find little evidence of mandate effects. Only two of
our outcomes show estimates that are significant at conventional levels, and these are directly
related to each other. In particular, the estimate for Medicaid is a positive 1.7 percentage
points (p < 0.05), and this is reflected in the significant 2.4 percentage point result for public
coverage (p < 0.1). One possible explanation for this surprising result is that the adoption of
some state mandates took place simultaneously with expansions to state Medicaid programs.
These Medicaid changes took place from the late 1990s through the mid-2000s and increased
Medicaid coverage for individuals over age 20 (Hamersma and Kim, 2013). On the other
hand, the Medicaid estimate on our extended sample (Appendix Table 1) is essentially
zero. Instead, military coverage is significant along with public coverage overall (though
19In some model specifications, Levine et al. (2011) obtained results consistent with “reverse crowd out”
of public coverage.
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public is smaller than in the main sample). Hence, these results may be originating from
measurement variability or other issues. Among the various forms of private coverage where
we would most expect to observe effects, we generally obtain estimates that are quite small,
with only employer provided and any coverage having even moderate magnitudes (and the
result for any coverage likely reflects the estimated increase in public). Nevertheless, we
note that while our results rule out strong effects, it is possible that the mandates could
have had small to moderate effects that our study does not have the precision to identify.
For example, on dependent coverage, the 95% confidence interval includes effects above 1.7
percentage points. Nevertheless, even if some effects are being overlooked here, it is clear
that the 23 to 25 year olds were less affected by the state mandates than the 19 to 22 year
olds.
Column (5) contains estimates for our subsample of 26 to 29 year olds. Generally, our
results for this group are very noisy, resulting in only one statistically significant estimate,
individually purchased insurance. Here we find it fell by 1.8 percentage points (p < 0.01).
One possible reason for such a result would be crowd out from another source. While we have
no other significant results, we note that our estimate for employer coverage as the policy
holder is positive in this sample. These two estimates would be consistent with eligible
individuals transitioning from coverage on individual plans to those through their own jobs,
though why such a result would be induced by mandates is unclear. Thus, the overall pattern
of estimates for this subsample is not consistent with a state mandate influence, though their
imprecision means that we cannot rule out a moderate-sized impact. This is also true for
our extended sample, where our results share most of the same characteristics of our main
sample – the point estimates are similar and are also generally imprecise. Unfortunately, we
do not have any other estimates from other papers in the literature to compare these results
to, since as far as we know, ours are the first estimates in the literature based on the 26 to
29 age group.
Considering our estimates of state mandate effects during the pre-ACA period as a whole,
we see that clear and strong effects are found for the youngest adults who became eligible for
parental coverage – a result consistent with policymaker goals. For older individuals, on the
other hand, who are most likely to be independent of their parents, we find little evidence
of the state laws inducing coverage gains or source changes. We use this insight to inform
our next analysis that incorporates the federal ACA mandate. Here we have two goals.
The first is to see if the ACA shares the same dichotomy in effectiveness between younger
and older individuals. Since the ACA did not share the restrictive eligibility requirements
of the state mandates, whether the ACA also reflects the heterogeneous effects by age will
tell us something about whether those requirements were the driving force behind the state
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mandates’ split effectiveness. The second goal is to see whether the effects of the state
mandates directly interacted with those of the ACA. To do so, we design our analysis to
tell us whether the groups most strongly affected by the state mandates were influenced
differently by the ACA than other groups. This will provide more context into how state
and federal mandates work when they simultaneously target similar populations and have
similar policy goals. Given our results above, our hypothesis is that the effect of the ACA
should be attenuated among the 19 to 22 year olds since that group already had health
insurance due to the state mandates.
5.2 Interaction Effects
Table 5 reports estimates of employer provided health insurance coverage effects based on
equation (2). In contrast to our pre-ACA, state-mandate analysis, which reports results for
eleven outcomes, for space reasons we present for only nine here. The omitted outcomes are
Medicaid and military coverage, which we chose to exclude since they are measured closely
by the public category. Also differing from our state analysis is the time period of our sample,
which consists of years 2000 through 2012, allowing us to observe two full years after the
implementation of the ACA’s federal mandate. Our sample is, therefore, much longer than
those of the other authors in this literature. Additionally, we again present a robustness
check based on our extended sample that covers the years 1990 or 1996 through 2012 in
Appendix Table 2.20 Our estimates from this extended sample substantially mimic our main
results. Both tables contain separate panels for each of the nine outcomes, and within each
panel are results from three independent regressions – one for each age subsample. We
present estimated effects for both the eligible and ineligible, as well as the difference between
the two. These represent estimates of β1 + β2, β2, and β1 from equation (2), respectively.
As before, all estimates reported in these tables should be interpreted as percentage point
changes in health insurance coverage – in this case attributable to eligibility for the federal
mandate.
We begin by comparing our estimates for overall coverage for our broadest sample to those
of other authors in the literature. Panel A, column (1) of Table 5 presents these results. We
find the ACA increased coverage for the ineligible by 3.9 percentage points, a statistically
20Due to data availability, the regressions on the extended sample differ from those on the primary sample
in that the controls for poverty and employment based on ACS/Census data were replaced by versions of the
same variables based on CPS data. In contrast to the state-age-year variation of the ACS/Census versions,
the CPS based variables vary at the age-year level because of the CPS’s much smaller sample size (state-age-
year cells can have very few CPS respondents). Our use of these CPS versions is possible for our state/federal
interaction analysis since we use a DD approach rather than the DDD model used in our state mandate,
pre-ACA focused analysis.
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significant result (p < 0.01), while our 2.9 percentage point estimate for the eligible is
not significant at conventional levels. The difference between these estimates is also not
significant. Of the other studies on the ACA mandate, only Cantor et al. (2012a) produced
estimates by eligibility status, finding a 3.8 percentage point increase in any coverage for
the ineligible, and (a surprising) 8.3 for the eligible. Gamino (2018) produced estimates
for the ACA effect on the ineligible only, finding a 5.5 percentage point increase. Other
authors produced estimates only for pooled statuses, with their results ranging from 2.9 to
4.7 percentage points (see panel B of Table 1 for a summary). Thus, our estimates are
consistent with the rest of the literature in noting that the ACA was effective in raising
overall coverage for young adults. Our overall estimates are distinct, however, in obtaining
a larger estimate for those who were ineligible for state mandates.
The rest of the estimates presented in Table 5 provide significant insight into how the
ACA effected the increase we find overall. Looking first at panel G, we find it induced an
interesting pattern of change in dependent coverage. For the 19 to 28 age group in column
(7), we estimate a much larger increase in dependent coverage for those who were ineligible
than for the eligible. Both groups saw statistically significant increases, but the effect for the
ineligible at 5.6 percentage points (p < 0.01) was more than double that of the eligible at 2.6
(p < 0.1). The 2.9 percentage point difference between the two is also significant (p < 0.1).
The estimates in the next two columns, however, show that the single estimate across ages
hides important heterogeneity. For 19 to 22 year olds, the ACA effect estimated in column
(8) is large for the ineligible, but much smaller and insignificant for the eligible – precisely
where the state mandates had been most impactful. On the other hand, among the 23 to
25 year olds in column (9), the ACA had similar sized effects for both the eligible and not.
This supports the argument that restrictive eligibility requirements are the reason the state
mandates did not have broader impact – not ERISA’s restrictions on state-level regulatory
authority. It is also worth noting that our significant point estimates here are remarkably
similar to those we obtained for the state mandate effect on 19 to 22 year olds. That is,
for dependent coverage, whenever we find a significant effect, the estimate magnitude is
consistent, regardless of whether the policy was state or federal in nature.
Since our measure of dependent coverage includes spousal coverage, we next examine
those results in panel I, finding all but one of the estimates in that panel are small and
insignificant. The one exception is a significant increase of 1.8 percentage points for ineligible
19 to 22 year olds (p < 0.05). As we noted above, it would not be surprising to observe crowd
out of spousal coverage, but a positive result is unexpected given the ACA mandate has no
feature targeted towards spousal coverage. Additionally, we also consider a larger estimate
for the 19 to 22 year olds unusual since they are less likely to be married than the 23 to 25
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year olds, for whom our estimates are effectively zero. While this estimate represents only a
small portion of the overall estimate for dependent coverage, we nevertheless took a closer
look at this result by re-estimating equation (2) after dropping the 28 year olds from our
sample. We take this step seeking to increase the similarity of the treatment and control
groups. When doing so, the significant result decreases in magnitude to 1.3 and becomes
insignificant. However, the estimate for 19 to 22 eligible young adults becomes significantly
positive at 1.2 percentage points. In contrast, our estimates for dependent coverage and
any health coverage are both similar whether we include the 28 year olds in the sample
or not. Thus, we are inclined to view the spousal coverage result we report in panel I with
skepticism given its comparative sensitivity to the sample. Whatever the case, though, given
the magnitude of our dependent coverage results, it is clear they are not driven by spousal
coverage.
Moving next to panel D, employer provided insurance, we see that the effect on dependent
coverage for the ineligible 19 to 22 year olds is reflected here, though the effect seen for the 23
to 25 year olds is not. In the CPS, the employer provided coverage outcome aggregates the
dependent (panel G) and policy holder (panel H) measures, so the reason we do not see effects
for the older group in employer coverage overall is because the increased dependent coverage
for this group crowded out coverage through the young adults’ own jobs. For ineligible 23
to 25 year olds, dependent coverage increased 5.4 percentage points while employer coverage
as the policy holder decreased by 5.1 (both p < 0.01). Similarly, for the eligible, the 4.8
percentage point increase in dependent coverage was offset by a decrease of 3 percentage
points in being the policy holder directly. Though this decrease was not significant, it still
resulted in the net effect on employer coverage being small and insignificant, despite the
large increase in dependent coverage. Among the 19 to 22 year olds, we find no evidence of
the crowd out of own policy coverage, with the natural explanation being that these young
adults are the least likely to have jobs that offer health insurance.
The next level up in aggregation is found in the private coverage outcome in panel B. Here
we find statistically significant increases in coverage for both age groups of the ineligible.
Estimates for the eligible are all insignificant, though the point estimates are quite similar
across eligibility status for the 23 to 25 year olds. The private coverage outcome combines
the employer provided, individually purchased, and outside home coverage sources, and,
again, it is insightful to compare the changes across these measures. For coverage outside
the home (panel F), we find substantial increases in coverage among the 23 to 25 year olds.
We also find an increase, though much smaller, for the eligible 19 to 23 year olds. As we
previously mentioned, coverage outside the home is likely to be substantially comprised of
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dependent coverage,21 so we are not surprised to find the larger increases are concentrated
among the older group, since they are more likely to live outside their parents’ homes. We
next note that for individually purchased plans (panel E) we find statistically significant
coverage decreases for each of the groups that saw increased outside home coverage, a result
consistent with young adults trading off individual plans for coverage through their parents’
plans. Looking at the underlying components of private coverage as a whole, we note that the
federal mandate induced substantial increases in coverage as a dependent (whether outside
the home or not) for groups that did not see big increases under the state mandates. For
the older individuals, however, this dependent coverage increase induced substantial crowd
out of plans obtained through young adults’ own employers or individually. For the younger
individuals, though, there was much less crowd out, primarily since those individuals did
not have jobs through which to obtain insurance. On net, then, we see the largest increases
in private coverage among the 19 to 22 year olds who were ineligible for state mandates.
Turning next to public health insurance in panel C, we present estimates that are gener-
ally small, with none statistically significant. We find this result somewhat surprising, given
our results on the state mandates which showed significant crowd out of public plans among
the 19 to 22 year old age group. For the older group of individuals, this finding can be largely
attributed to the ACA’s dependent coverage effect crowding out other private sources, rather
than public ones. But for the ineligible 19 to 22 year olds, the lack of crowd out of public
sources means we essentially observe no crowd out at all among any alternative sources for
this group. Overall, our lack of effects found for public coverage means that our results for
any coverage in panel A essentially reflect net changes in private coverage only. Consistent
with this, our estimates in panel A closely resemble those found for private coverage in panel
B.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we performed a comprehensive analysis of the effects of both state and federal
dependent coverage mandates on health insurance coverage of young adults. Our investiga-
tion is unique in the literature in that we bring together three important analytical features:
newly available, accurate data on the state mandates; a focus on heterogeneity across age
groups likely to differ in their dependence on their parents; and avoidance of endogenous
individual characteristics when imputing eligibility for state mandates. Our results provide
21The CPS does not track the source of insurance when the policy is held by someone outside the respon-
dent’s home. Since it is not a public policy, though, it is included in the private coverage measure (if it were
public, it would be a policy held directly by the respondent).
24
new insights on the effectiveness of the state mandates, how they interact with the ACA,
and how differences in their designs might explain variation in their effectiveness. For the
state mandates, we found they significantly increased dependent and overall coverage rates
among young adults between ages 19 and 22. We also found evidence this new dependent
coverage was partially offset due to crowd out of public health insurance. In contrast, we
find little evidence of changes in coverage for 23 to 25 year olds. It is possible there was
some effect of these mandates that we are simply unable to detect, but our results strongly
point to larger effects for the younger individuals in our sample. We argue this dichotomy is
consistent with young adults gaining independence as they age, making them less likely to
take up coverage with eligibility requirements that limit this independence. With regard to
the ACA, we present strong evidence that its effects were not uniform. We find it increased
dependent coverage for all groups except those whom had been most strongly affected by
the state mandates – eligible 19 to 22 year olds. This increase in coverage flows through
to overall coverage, though less so for 23 to 25 year olds, as they also became less likely to
hold their own, employer-provided policies or private coverage from the individual market.
Since young adults ages 19 to 22 are less likely to hold jobs that offer health insurance, we
find much less evidence among them for this type of coverage crowd out. In contrast to
our results for the state mandates, we find no evidence that the ACA crowded out public
coverage.
From these results, we draw three broad conclusions. First, our results provide strong
evidence that the states were able to effect changes in health insurance coverage despite
ERISA limits on its regulatory authority, a finding consistent with evidence found by authors
studying other types of mandates (Gruber, 1994; Schmidt, 2007; Bitler and Schmidt, 2012;
Bitler and Carpenter, 2016, 2017). To the extent that researchers have found effects of the
state mandates difficult to pin down, this has more to do with having correct data on the
mandates and identifying the population of people likely to take-up coverage than it does
with ERISA. Second, we find that the ACA had a much smaller impact where the state
mandates had the most influence. This is clear evidence of interactive effects in a case where
state and federal mandates simultaneously target the same populations. This suggests that
researchers studying overlapping policies – especially those on health insurance coverage –
should be careful to account for state and federal policy interplay. Third, we found the state
mandates were clearly effective for younger individuals, and less so for older ones, while
the ACA did not seem to be limited in its scope by age. In our view, this suggests that
the eligibility restrictions imposed by the states were the driving force behind their reduced
impact among the older individuals they targeted.
We close by pointing out that, in our view, one of our more interesting findings was
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that the ACA induced older individuals to transition into dependent coverage and out of
other sources of private coverage, while the state mandates saw younger individuals trade
off public for private coverage. At this point we do not have a clear explanation for why
these policies should have differed in this way, and view this as a question worthy of future
research.
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Table 1: A Brief Summary of Studies on Dependent Coverage Mandate Effects on Health Insurance Coverage
Study Sample Eligibility Criteria Conclusion
A: State Mandates
Monheit et al. (2011) Years 2000-2008
Ages 19-29
State, year, age, school,
marriage
1.5 ppt increase in dependent coverage offset by reduction in own em-
ployer coverage. No overall coverage change.
Levine et al. (2011) Years 1999-2008
Ages 19-24
State, year, age, school,
marriage, # of children
3.3 ppt overall coverage increase, 4.4 ppt increase in private coverage.
Burgdorf (2014) Years 2000-2008
Ages 19-29
State, year, age, school,
marriage, # of children
Monheit et al. (2011) results driven by spousal coverage. Levine et al.
(2011) results sensitive to specification changes.
Depew (2015) Years 2000-2009
Ages 19-29
State, year, age 2.3 ppt increase in dependent coverage, but no overall coverage change.
Trudeau & Conway (2018) Years 1997-2009
Ages 19-29
State, year, age No overall coverage change.
Gamino (2018) Years 1996-2010
Ages 19-24
State, year, age, school,
marriage
3.7 ppt increase overall, 4.2 ppt increase in private, 5.6 ppt increase in
employer coverage.
Study Sample Comparison Groups Conclusion
B: ACA Mandate
Akosa Antwi et al. (2013) SIPP 2008 Panel
Years 2008-2011
Trt: Ages 19-25
Ctl: Ages 16-18, 27-29
3.2 ppt increase overall, 7 ppt increase in dependent coverage, and de-
creases of 0.8 ppt and 3.1 ppt in individual and own employer coverage.
Cantor et al. (2012a) Years 2004-2010 Trt: Non-students ages
19-23 and all aged 24-25
Ctl: Ages 27-30
5.3 ppt increase in dependent coverage and 3.5 ppt decrease in unin-
surance, with effects much larger in states with their own mandates.
Sommers & Kronick (2012) Years 2005-2010 Trt: Ages 19-25
Ctl: Ages 26-34
2.9 ppt increase overall, 2.8 increase in private, 4.3 ppt increase in de-
pendent coverage, and 2.5 decrease as policy holder. Effects on overall
coverage were larger for minority groups.
Sommers et al. (2013) NHIS
Yrs 2005-2011q3
Trt: Ages 19-25
Ctl: Ages 26-34
4.7 ppt increase overall, 5.1 ppt increase in private coverage. Positive
overall effect extended through Q3 of 2011.
Gamino (2018) ACS
Years 2008-2013
Trt: Ages 23-25
Ctl: Ages 27-29
For the ineligible: 5.5 ppt increase overall, 6.5 ppt for private, 8.1 ppt
for employer. 1 ppt crowd out of individual and public coverage.
Notes: Samples are based on the CPS ASEC unless otherwise specified. SIPP = Survey of Income and Program Participation, ACS = American
Community Survey, NHIS = National Health Interview Survey, and ppt = percentage point. We report estimates that do not use endogenous
eligibility criteria, to the extent possible. Sample time periods reflect reference years.
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Table 2: Comparison (through 2010) of State Mandate Research
Includes year of law change and associated maximum age of eligibility
Levine et al. Monheit et al. Trudeau &
Depew (2015) Gamino (2018) (2011) (2011) (Conway 2018)
State Year Age Year Age Year Age Year Age Year Age
CO 2006 24 2006 24 2006 24 2006 24 2006 24
CT 2009 25 1982, 1987, 2007 23, 22, 25 2009 25
DE 2008 23 2006 23 2007 23 2007 23 2007 23
DC 2010 25
FL 2008, 2009 24, 29 1992, 2008 25, 30 2007 24 2007 24 2007, 2008 24, 29
GA 1983, 2005 24, 25 2005 25
ID 2008 24 1994, 2007 22, 24 2007 24 2007 24 2007 24
IL 2010 25 2009 25 2004 26 2009 25
IN 2008 23 1990, 2007, 2010 24, 23, 25 2007 23 2007 23 2007 23
IA 2009 None 1986 24 2008 None
KY 2008 25 2008 24 2008 25
LA 2009 23 1997, 2010 23, 25 2009 23
ME 2007 24 2007 24 2007 24 2007 24 2007 24
MD 2008 24 2008 24 2008 24 2008 24
MA 2007 25 2007 25 2006 24 2007 25 2007 25
MN 2008 24 1993 24 2008 24 2008 24
MO 2008 24 2008 25 2008 24 2008 24
MT 2008 24 2008 24 2008 24 2008 24
NE
NH 2007 25 2007 25 2007 25 2007 25 2007 25
NJ 2006, 2009 29, 30 2006, 2008 29, 30 2006 29 2006 29 2006, 2009 29, 30
NM 2003 24 2003 24 2005 24 2003 24 2003 24
NY 2010 29 1984, 2009 22, 29 2009 29
ND 1995 25 1995 25 1985, 1995 22, 25
OH 2010 27
OR 1997 22
PA 2010 29 2009 29 2009 29
RI 2007 24 2000 24 2007 24 2007 24 2007 24
SD 2005, 2007 23, 30 2005 23 2005 23 2007 29 2005, 2007 23, 29
TN 1986 23 2008 22
TX 2005 None 2005 24 2003 24 2004 None 2004 None
UT 1995 25 1993, 1994 21, 25 1994 25 1995 25 1995 25
VA 2007 24 1986 24 2007 24 2007 24 2007 24
WA 2009 24 2009 24 2007 24 2009 24
WV 2007 24 1997, 2007 22, 24 2007 24 2007 24 2007 24
WI 2007 26 2009 None
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Under 26 Years Old Over 25 Years Old
Eligible Ineligible Eligible Ineligible
n = 66,348 n = 134,831 n = 7,409 n = 112,832
Std. Std. Std. Std.
Variable Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
Health Insurance
Any 0.699 0.459 0.710 0.454 0.713 0.452 0.729 0.445
Public 0.141 0.348 0.142 0.349 0.140 0.347 0.122 0.328
Private 0.589 0.492 0.599 0.490 0.599 0.490 0.634 0.482
Medicaid 0.110 0.313 0.110 0.313 0.109 0.312 0.089 0.285
Military 0.028 0.166 0.030 0.170 0.025 0.155 0.028 0.165
Employer Provided 0.463 0.499 0.488 0.500 0.542 0.498 0.586 0.493
Individually Purchased 0.054 0.226 0.060 0.237 0.062 0.241 0.055 0.228
Covered Outside Home 0.096 0.295 0.077 0.267 0.013 0.112 0.009 0.097
Own Group Policy 0.182 0.386 0.250 0.433 0.423 0.494 0.454 0.498
Dependent Coverage 0.287 0.453 0.241 0.428 0.138 0.345 0.148 0.355
Covered by Spouse 0.029 0.168 0.041 0.199 0.104 0.306 0.128 0.334
Age 21.673 1.834 22.214 2.034 27.289 1.102 27.516 1.121
Female 0.497 0.500 0.494 0.500 0.497 0.500 0.499 0.500
White 0.777 0.417 0.778 0.416 0.774 0.418 0.780 0.414
Black 0.159 0.365 0.135 0.342 0.145 0.352 0.132 0.339
Asian 0.036 0.186 0.041 0.197 0.060 0.238 0.048 0.213
Other Race 0.029 0.168 0.046 0.211 0.021 0.143 0.039 0.194
Hispanic 0.190 0.393 0.191 0.393 0.190 0.392 0.201 0.401
Poverty*
Below Poverty Line* 0.191 0.393 0.177 0.382 0.150 0.357 0.138 0.345
100%–124%* 0.052 0.222 0.051 0.219 0.041 0.197 0.044 0.205
125%–149%* 0.055 0.227 0.055 0.229 0.047 0.213 0.049 0.215
Above 150%* 0.702 0.457 0.717 0.450 0.762 0.426 0.770 0.421
Metropolitan Classification
Not in Metro Area 0.128 0.334 0.158 0.365 0.087 0.282 0.142 0.349
Central city 0.270 0.444 0.322 0.467 0.300 0.458 0.329 0.470
Outside Central City 0.443 0.497 0.381 0.486 0.492 0.500 0.389 0.487
Not Identified 0.159 0.366 0.139 0.346 0.121 0.326 0.141 0.348
Married* 0.136 0.343 0.174 0.379 0.352 0.478 0.451 0.498
Divorced* 0.026 0.158 0.027 0.161 0.053 0.223 0.072 0.259
Single* 0.838 0.368 0.800 0.400 0.595 0.491 0.476 0.499
State-by-Age-by-Year Measures
Poverty Rate 0.343 0.073 0.316 0.073 0.235 0.043 0.234 0.053
Employment Rate 0.633 0.100 0.665 0.093 0.746 0.035 0.757 0.041
Notes: Measures indicated by “*” were not included in regression models and are included for descriptive
purposes only. Source: Author calculations.
32
Table 4: Effect of State Expansions on Health Insurance Coverage, 2000 through 2010
Ages Included in the Sample
Insurance Type 19 to 29 19 to 25 19 to 22 23 to 25 26 to 29
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: Broadly Defined
Any 0.0158 0.00897 0.0278** 0.0169 -0.0330
(0.0100) (0.0121) (0.0105) (0.0175) (0.0387)
Private 0.0142 0.00602 0.0741*** -0.00325 -0.0202
(0.00973) (0.0149) (0.0117) (0.0164) (0.0297)
Public 0.00471 0.00401 -0.0413*** 0.0237* -0.00258
(0.00550) (0.0103) (0.00572) (0.0140) (0.0217)
B: Private Coverage
Employer Provided 0.00845 -0.000887 0.0395*** 0.00829 -0.00390
(0.0110) (0.0131) (0.0113) (0.0205) (0.0263)
Individually Purchased -0.00121 0.00349 0.0172*** -0.00486 -0.0179***
(0.00399) (0.00655) (0.00416) (0.0111) (0.00640)
Covered Outside Home 0.00523* 0.00425 0.0126** -0.00213 -0.00349
(0.00288) (0.00329) (0.00480) (0.00445) (0.00482)
C: Employer Coverage
Covered as Dependent 0.00987* 0.0110 0.0576*** 0.000195 -0.0297
(0.00546) (0.0107) (0.00809) (0.00876) (0.0247)
Policy Holder 0.00210 -0.00308 -0.00838 0.00581 0.0343
(0.0130) (0.0101) (0.00678) (0.0170) (0.0504)
Covered as Dependent -0.00353 -0.000924 -0.00564** -0.00407 -0.0186
(via spouse) (0.00354) (0.00410) (0.00262) (0.00724) (0.0255)
D: Public Coverage
Medicaid -0.00296 0.00258 -0.0338*** 0.0172** -0.0163
(0.00531) (0.00855) (0.00687) (0.00849) (0.0162)
Military 0.00854*** 0.00107 -0.0153*** 0.00554 0.00942
(0.00322) (0.00370) (0.00307) (0.00715) (0.0130)
Obs. 274,473 171,978 99,041 72,937 102,495
Notes: All estimates are of the ρ coefficient in equation (1) and are produced via separate WLS regres-
sions. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the state level. SHADAC summary
health insurance weights used in all regressions. Statistically significant estimates for two-tailed tests
at one, five, and ten-percent levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. All models include the
same controls: age-year, age-state, and state-year fixed effects; dummies for race, ethnicity, gender, and
metropolitan classification; and age-by-state-by-year employment and poverty rates. Source: Author
calculations.
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Table 5: Effect of ACA Mandate on Health Insurance Coverage by State Mandate Eligibility, 2000 through 2012
Ages Included in the Sample
Eligibility for 19-28 19-22, 26-28 23-28 19-28 19-22, 26-28 23-28 19-28 19-22, 26-28 23-28
State Mandates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A: Any Health Insurance D: Employer Provided (EPI) G: EPI – Dependent Coverage
Eligible 0.0288 0.0200 0.0370 0.0158 0.0179 0.00898 0.0262* 0.0110 0.0481**
(0.0204) (0.0216) (0.0231) (0.0217) (0.0245) (0.0289) (0.0147) (0.0140) (0.0222)
Ineligible 0.0389*** 0.0593*** 0.0228* 0.0146 0.0500*** -0.00451 0.0555*** 0.0642*** 0.0543***
(0.00899) (0.00947) (0.0125) (0.00945) (0.0101) (0.0115) (0.00765) (0.00933) (0.00939)
Difference -0.0101 -0.0393 0.0142 0.00118 -0.0321 0.0135 -0.0294* -0.0531*** -0.00620
(0.0226) (0.0235) (0.0265) (0.0238) (0.0261) (0.0311) (0.0165) (0.0166) (0.0241)
B: Private Health Insurance E: Individually Purchased H: EPI – Policy Holder
Eligible 0.0229 0.0148 0.0297 -0.0317*** -0.0230*** -0.0421*** -0.00375 0.0126 -0.0304
(0.0182) (0.0218) (0.0204) (0.00445) (0.00447) (0.00762) (0.0290) (0.0303) (0.0294)
Ineligible 0.0381*** 0.0537*** 0.0314** -0.0109* -0.00284 -0.0162*** -0.0374*** -0.0159 -0.0512***
(0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0129) (0.00945) (0.0101) (0.0115) (0.00950) (0.0115) (0.0110)
Difference -0.0152 -0.0388 -0.001682 -0.0208*** -0.0202* -0.0260*** 0.0336 0.0286 0.0208
(0.0211) (0.0242) (0.0243) (0.00703) (0.0107) (0.00895) (0.0306) (0.0322) (0.0314)
C: Public Health Insurance F: Covered Outside Home I: EPI – Spousal Coverage
Eligible 0.00863 0.00672 0.0123 0.0361*** 0.0197*** 0.0576*** 0.00421 0.00651 0.000398
(0.00670) (0.0104) (0.0103) (.00324) (.00460) (.00854) (0.00495) (0.00469) (0.00620)
Ineligible -0.00124 0.00745 -0.0141 0.0319*** 0.00388 0.0482*** 0.00745 0.0183** 0.00153
(0.00667) (0.00768) (0.00922) (0.00919) (0.0112) (0.00610) (0.00571) (0.00756) (0.00609)
Difference 0.00987 -0.000734 0.0264* 0.00422 0.0158 0.00940 -0.00324 -0.0118 -0.00114
(0.00928) (0.0129) (0.0136) (0.00983) (0.0122) (0.0103) (0.00744) (0.00873) (0.00862)
Obs. 290,178 205,054 174,123 290,178 205,054 174,123 290,178 205,054 174,123
Notes: Estimates are of β1, β2, and their sum, from equation (2). Each column within a table cell presents a separate WLS regression
(using SHADAC summary health insurance weights). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. Statistically
significant estimates for two-tailed tests at one, five, and ten-percent levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. All models
include the same controls: age-state and state-year fixed effects; dummies for race, ethnicity, gender, and metropolitan classification; and
age-state-year employment and poverty rates. Source: Author calculations.
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Appendix
Appendix Table 1: Effect of State Expansions on Health Insurance (Extended Sample
Period)
Ages Included in the Sample
Insurance Type 19 to 29 19 to 25 19 to 22 23 to 25 26 to 29
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: Broadly Defined n=465,027 n=287,176 n=163,371 n=123,805 n=177,851
Any 0.00700 0.00202 0.0215** 0.00407 -0.0223
(0.00729) (0.00864) (0.0104) (0.0144) (0.0400)
Private 0.0130* 0.00441 0.0585*** -0.00407 -0.0214
(0.00709) (0.0113) (0.00954) (0.0153) (0.0280)
Public -0.00733 -0.00179 -0.0326*** 0.0129* 0.00914
(0.00497) (0.00742) (0.00826) (0.00696) (0.0236)
B: Private Coverage n=358,997 n=223,596 n=128,247 n=95,349 n=135,401
Employer Provided 0.0132 0.00923 0.0534*** 0.0111 -0.00709
(0.00934) (0.0137) (0.00941) (0.0179) (0.0229)
Indiv. Purchased -0.00215 0.000900 0.00573 -0.00830 -0.0161**
(0.00309) (0.00642) (0.00403) (0.00941) (0.00678)
Cov’d Outside Home 0.00261 -0.00236 -0.0147*** -0.00310 -0.00202
(0.00303) (0.00396) (0.00460) (0.00394) (0.00472)
C: Employer Coverage n=358,997 n=223,596 n=128,247 n=95,349 n=135,401
Cov’d as Dependent 0.00808 0.0143 0.0539*** 0.000413 -0.0185
(0.00583) (0.00899) (0.00654) (0.00629) (0.0160)
Policy Holder 0.00830 -0.00141 0.00204 0.00593 0.0212
(0.0121) (0.0106) (0.00500) (0.0165) (0.0401)
Cov’d as Dependent -0.0000922 0.00461 0.000671 0.000445 -0.00865
(via spouse) (0.00239) (0.00459) (0.00220) (0.00579) (0.0166)
D: Public Coverage n=465,027 n=287,176 n=163,371 n=123,805 n=177,851
Medicaid -0.0112** -0.00731 -0.0318*** 0.000265 -0.00565
(0.00537) (0.00704) (0.00815) (0.00697) (0.0187)
Military 0.00335 0.00409 -0.00927*** 0.0113** 0.0100
(0.00257) (0.00355) (0.00325) (0.00498) (0.0123)
Notes: Sample period for panels A and D is 1990 to 2010, while for panels B and C it is 1996 to 2010 due
to data availability limitations. Other than sample differences, the notes to Table 4 apply here except
that employment and poverty rate controls are not included. ACS data is not available for the whole
time period, and CPS sample sizes are not large enough for age-state-year rates to be calculated reliably.
Source: Author calculations.
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Appendix Table 2: Effect of ACA Mandate on Health Insurance Coverage by State Mandate Eligibility (Extended Sample
Period)
Ages Included in the Sample
Eligibility for 19-28 19-22, 26-28 23-28 19-28 19-22, 26-28 23-28 19-28 19-22, 26-28 23-28
State Mandates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A: Any Health Insurance D: Employer Provided (EPI) G: EPI – Dependent Coverage
Eligible 0.0280 0.0190 0.0366 0.00328 0.00237 0.000989 0.0198 0.00178 0.0459**
(0.0205) (0.0222) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0251) (0.0289) (0.0146) (0.0143) (0.0215)
Ineligible 0.0439*** 0.0660*** 0.0275** 0.0150 0.0485*** -0.00219 0.0600*** 0.0652*** 0.0586***
(0.00755) (0.00885) (0.0113) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0113) (0.00842) (0.0100) (0.0102)
Difference -0.0159 -0.0470* 0.00914 -0.0117 -0.0461* 0.00318 -0.0402** -0.0634*** -0.0127
(0.0224) (0.0243) (0.0257) (0.0250) (0.0273) (0.0309) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0236)
B: Private Health Insurance E: Individually Purchased H: EPI – Policy Holder
Eligible 0.0169 0.00742 0.0253 -0.0302*** -0.0204*** -0.0408*** -0.0115 0.00551 -0.0382
(0.0187) (0.0225) (0.0202) (0.00440) (0.00477) (0.00726) (0.0286) (0.0293) (0.0295)
Ineligible 0.0442*** 0.0599*** 0.0361*** -0.0122** -0.00392 -0.0169*** -0.0380*** -0.0164 -0.0510***
(0.00869) (0.00793) (0.0118) (0.00537) (0.00960) (0.00479) (0.00870) (0.0111) (0.00893)
Difference -0.0273 -0.0524** -0.0108 -0.0180** -0.0164 -0.0239*** 0.0266 0.0219 0.0128
(0.0206) (0.0239) (0.0232) (0.00680) (0.0105) (0.00846) (0.0299) (0.0310) (0.0306)
C: Public Health Insurance F: Covered Outside Home I: EPI – Spousal Coverage
Eligible 0.0145** 0.0149 0.0161* 0.0399*** 0.0251*** 0.0592*** -0.000186 0.00129 -0.00335
(0.006) (0.00926) (0.00950) (0.00449) ( 0.00526) (0.00859) (0.00514) (0.00483) (0.00660)
Ineligible -0.00323 0.00724 -0.0156 0.0369*** 0.0124 0.0500*** 0.00744 0.0183** 0.00121
(0.00641) (0.00688) (0.00940) (0.00879) (0.0103) (0.00625) (0.00534) (0.00760) (0.00578)
Difference 0.0178* 0.00764 0.0317** 0.00301 0.0127 0.00926 -0.00763 -0.0170* -0.00456
(0.00902) (0.0115) (0.0133) (0.00995) (0.0117) (0.0104) (0.00724) (0.00893) (0.00854)
Obs. 460999 325007 280614 366075 258539 220814 366075 258539 220814
Notes: Sample period of outcomes in panels A, B, amd C is 1990 to 2012, while all others is 1996 to 2012 (due to data availability).
Otherwise, the notes to Table 5 apply here except that employment and poverty rate controls are vary at the age-year level, not the age-
state-year level because ACS data is not available for the whole time period, and CPS sample sizes are not large enough for age-state-year
rates to be calculated reliably. Source: Author calculations.
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